FACTS
The appellant was admitted at the mental hospital at Yaba, Lagos, between 1977 and 1978 for treatment of a mental illness. He was later discharged and returned to his home where his condition continued to improve.
His behaviour appeared normal until six months later when he began to misbehave. He was, with difficulty, again taken back to the mental hospital at Yaba, with a warning that he should desist from taking Indian hemp. Appellant remained on admission at the hospital until about the end of 1979 when he was discharged, he reverted to taking Indian hemp which led to a lapse in his health. He began to threaten people who lived near him and on one occasion even threatened the deceased (his mother), who had to be rescued from his attack.
On the 4th of February, 1980 the appellant was seen by the police waving a matchet. He was arrested and detained by the police; his father (P.W.2) and his mother (Deceased) were invited to the police station, where his father confirmed that the appellant was using Indian hemp. The appellant attributed his use of Indian hemp to his father’s refusal to give him money to fix his bus or get a new one. The appellant was subsequently released by the police and on reaching home on the 5th day of February 1980; his father suggested to him that he should return to the mental hospital for treatment. Appellant agreed to go if he received N20 as feeding allowance. The deceased gave him N5 and promised to give him the balance on the day he will return to the mental hospital. At around 9pm that day, one Bankole went together with the appellant and P.W.4 to inform the deceased that the appellant was still suffering from mental illness. As the deceased, the appellants mother was leaving separately from P.W.2 her husband, she asked the appellant, P.W.4 and Bankole to accompany her to his house, while they were interacting outside the house of P.W.2, the deceased untied her wrapper to bring the remaining N15 as promised, the appellant suddenly produced a matchet which was hidden in his garment and attacked the deceased. The appellant struck the deceased on the head and back, she fell down and died, P.W.4 and Bankole sprinted away while the appellant engaged his father in a 100 meters dash before giving up the chase.
At about 9:30 pm Pius Ajayi Akodu a deputy superintendent of police saw the accused coming out of a corner, holding a matchet in one hand and a bottle of larger beer on the other, the accused was shouting “O Tan Nnu Mi” meaning the matter is now settled, he observed that the appellant was licking something on his matchet, he ordered the appellant to stop and subsequently arrested him and took him to the police station at Aiyetoro. The appellant testified in his defence, he did not call any other witness, he identified P.W.2 as his father, he said he knew the deceased and that she was his mother. He said he had not done anything unusual to her at any time material to the case and that he didn’t know her whereabouts.
In his judgement the trial judge held relying on the testimony of P.W.1 Dr. Sijuwola that the accused was sane at the time of committing the offence as he had already formed the intention to kill the deceased, the trial judge further maintained that there was no evidence before him which established that at the time of committing the offence charged the appellant was insane. Not satisfied with the decision, appellant appealed to the court of appeal, who dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction of the appellant holding that the defence of insanity had not been proved by the appellant, to them, his defence that he was not aware of what had happened to his mother was no more than an ipse dixit and could not support the defence of insanity. Still feeling hard done by, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The unanimous judgment of the apex court was delivered by Uwais J.S.C. he reaffirmed that for a person to come under the S.28 of the Criminal Code Act, he must be in a state of mental disease, or natural mental infirmity at time of doing the act or making the omission to deprive him of the capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission. The court restated that the burden of proving insanity rests on the accused person pursuant to Section 139(1) and that this burden will discharged if the court is satisfied with the evidence given by the prosecution, whether on cross examination or otherwise. According to the court the testimony of P.W.1 concerned only the fitness of the accused to stand trial as imposed by Section 223 of the Criminal Procedural Act. It was not evidence proffered during the trial of the accused and as such the trial court and the appeal court were all in error by assessing the testimony of P.W.1 to establish the sanity of the accused when the unlawful killing was committed. To the learned justices of the Supreme Court the only evidence that was available before the learned trial judge and from which the defence of inanity could be assessed were the testimonies of P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.6 and P.W.7. finally the court opined that though section 140 (3)(c) places the onus of establishing insanity on the accused, it does not mean that the accused must necessarily call evidence to do so for it is not infrequently possible for the accused person to extract from the prosecution relevant evidence that can discharge the burden placed on it. After a careful evaluation of the case of both parties the Supreme Court opined that though the appellant undoubtedly killed the deceased, he was not guilty of murder by reason of insanity.
Substantive issue
The substantive issue in this case is the burden of proof in cases of insanity. Burden of proof is the obligation placed on a party to persuade the court of the veracity of the facts he relies upon, pursuant to Section 132 the burden lies on that person in a suit or proceeding who will fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. In criminal cases it is trite that the prosecution bears the burden of proof. According to Section 36(5) of the 1999 constitution every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This constitutional law principle stems from the common law; the principle was stated in Woolmington v DPP, confirmed in Mancini v. DPP and adopted by the Nigerian courts in R v. Eka. It must however be noted that the general rule that the burden of proof in criminal cases lies on the prosecution is not without exceptions, one of such exceptions is the case of insanity. Section 27 of the Criminal Code Act provides that every person is deemed to be of sound mind at any time which comes in question, until the contrary is proved. The burden of proving the contrary is on the accused. According to the supreme court in Egbe Nkanu v. State, it is plain beyond argument that, where, under our criminal laws, an accused person is entitled to a special defence by evidence, like in cases of insanity, the onus of establishing that evidence lies on him. Section 139(2) of the evidence Act provides that this burden placed on the accused person will be discharged if the court is satisfied by evidence given by the prosecution, whether on cross examination or otherwise, that such circumstances exist. However Section 139(3)(b) of the Evidence Act provides that nothing in subsection (2) shall affect the burden placed on the accused person to prove the defence of insanity but as observed by the Supreme Court in Sule Noman Makosa V. State as follows:-
“it may well be, as the learned trial judge observed, that Section 139(3)(c) of the Evidence Act places the onus of establishing insanity on the accused person. That however does not mean that the accused must necessarily call evidence to do so for it is not infrequently possible for an accused person to extract from the prosecution witness such evidence as would be sufficient to discharge the onus which the law has placed on him in this respect”
It is now settled though in our jurisprudence that the question whether an accused person who sets up the defence of insanity is in fact insane is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge. In determining the defence, the trial judge is enjoined to take into cognizance any admissible medical evidence and the whole of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case, which will include the nature of the killing, the conduct of the accused before, at the time of as well as after the killing and any history of mental abnormality as can be gleaned from a long line of cases which include Rv Inyang, Walton v. Queen and James Anyim v. State
No comments:
Post a Comment