JACOB OYEROGBA & ANOR v.
EGBEWOLE OLAOPA
(1998) LPELR-2878(SC)
In The Supreme Court of
Nigeria
On Friday, the 18th day of
December, 1998
SC.300/1990
Before Their Lordships
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE
Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR BASHIR WALI Justice
of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EMANUEL OBIOMA OGWUEGBU
Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
UTHMAN MOHAMMED Justice of
The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANTHONY IKECHUKWU IGUH
Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
1. JACOB OYEROGBA (THE BAALE
OF IGBOORA)
2. SUNDAY OLAOYE AJADI
(JOINED BY ORDER OF COURT DATED 26/10/95)
Appellant(s)
AND
EGBEWOLE OLAOPA
(FOR AND ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
AND OJE AND OJO FAMILIES)
Respondent(s)
Other Citations
Oyerogba v. Olaopa (1998) 13
NWLR (Pt.583)509
RATIO DECIDENDI
1. EVIDENCE - "Privies": Classification of
"Privies" in relation to the doctrine of res judicata
"In Coker & Or. v.
Sanyaolu (1976) 9-10 S.C. 20:1, this court considered the terminology
"Privies" in relation to the doctrine of res judicata and classified
them into three namely: (1) Privies in blood (as ancestor and heir); (2)
Privies in law (as testator and executor; intestate and administrator) and (3)
Privies inestate (as vendor and purchaser, lessor and lessee)." Per
Ogwuegbu, J.S.C (P.26, Paras. A-C) (...read in context)
2. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL: The Nature of Estoppel
"Estoppel is now more
than rule of practice and it can rightly be described as substantive rule of
law. There is estoppel where a party is precluded from saying a certain
statement of fact is untrue whether in reality it is true or not. Estoppel, in
nature, is a conclusion creating a disability whereby a party is precluded from
contending or proving in any legal proceedings that a fact is otherwise than it
has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability." Per
Belgore, J.S.C (P. 10, Paras. E-G) (...read in context)
3. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL BY DEED: When is Estoppel by deed
said to occur
"The estoppel by deed
occurs where a statement of facts is in a solemn deed made by parties and
authenticated by their seals whereby they cannot be heard to resile from the
facts clearly set out therein. Those facts are clearly binding on the parties
thereto." Per Belgore, J.S.C (P. 12, Paras. B-C) (...read in context)
4. EVIDENCE - ISSUE ESTOPPEL: When is issue estoppel said
to arise
"Issue estoppel arises
where an issue had earlier on been adjudicated upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction and the same issue comes incidentally in question in a subsequent
proceedings between the same parties or their privies. The conditions for the
application for the doctrine are that: (i) The same question was decided in
both proceedings: (ii) The judicial decision said to create the estoppel was
final: and (iii) The parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the
same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised
on their privies. See: Fadiora & or v. Gbadebo & or (supra)." Per
Ogwuegbu, J.S.C (P. 24, Paras. B-F) (...read in context)
5. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL: Types of Estoppel
"There are four kinds of
estoppel, viz: "Estoppel by matter of record", "estoppel by
deed", "estoppel in pais" and "promissory
estoppel"." Per Belgore, J.S.C (Pp. 10-11, Paras. G-A) (...read in
context)
6. EVIDENCE - PLEA OF ESTOPPEL: When is a plea of estoppel
said to be unsuitable
"A plea of estoppel is
not sustainable only where the heading of the later action strictly reflected
the same capacity as in the earlier one, Strict emphasis on the heading of the
action to show capacity is misleading. Once it is made clear that the self-same
question is substantially in issue in two suits the precise form in which
either suit is brought or the fact that the plaimiff in the one case was the
defendant in the other is immaterial. The estoppel subsists between the panics.
See Ojo v. Abadie 15 W.A.C.A 54 at 55." Per Ogwuegbu, J.S.C (P. 27, Paras.
A-C) (...read in context)
7. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL OF RECORD: Nature of Estoppel of
Record
"Estoppel of record is
also called "estoppel quasi of record" and is commonly called an
"estoppel per rem judicatam" where an issue of fact has been
judicially considered and determined to finality or to the exhaustion of all
judicial remedies. This implies that the fact in issue was judicially
pronounced upon and there was no appeal against that decision, or there was
futile exercise of that right of appeal to finality. The tribunal must have
jurisdiction, concurrent or exclusive, in the matter between the same parties
or their privies on the same facts and subject matter, whether affecting a
certain state of matters as to status of a person or thing. The situation as
far as the facts in issue are concerned is that those facts or issues have
finally been decided and laid to rest between the parties or their privies. It
is a rule to stop vexatious repeated litigation on the same issue between
virtually the same parties and subject-matter. Where the earlier decision is by
a court of record the resulting estoppel is said to be of record; where it is
by any other tribunal it is said to be estoppel quasi record. It does nor
matter whether the earlier decision is by an inferior court of record: the
golden thread always is that that tribunal has jurisdiction and has pronounced
on the facts in issue and it is final whether because of its exclusive
jurisdiction or because there was no appeal against its pronouncement, or where
an appeal was available and utilised. It was futile or failed. (See this Courts
decisions in Balogun v. Adejobi (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 131; Ezeanya v. Okeke
(1995) 4 NWLR (P1. 388) 142; Adedoyo v. Babalola (1995) 7 NWLR (P1. 408) 383:
Faleye Otapo (1995) 3NWLR (Pt.381)" Per Belgore, J.S.C (Pp. 11-12, Paras.
A-A) (...read in context)
BELGORE, J.S.C. (Delivering
the Leading Judgment): This is a mailer concerning the succession of minor
chieftaincy of Onilado of Igboora. Igboora is in the Ibarapa district of those
southwestern Oyo speaking Yorubas but was under the suzerainty of Baale of
Ibadan (now known as Olubadan of Ibadan). They share boundary with Egbas to the
South and Yewas (formerly Egbados) to the southwest. Essentially they are Oyos
but by linguistic twist known as Ibarapas. Ighoora has as its village head a
Baale. In this suit as it is now the style in many Yoruba hamlets, attempt was
made to refer to Baale as "Olora of Igboora", but for the purpose of
(his judgment it is the title of Baale that I shall use.
The 1st appellant. Jacob Oyerogba the Baale
(Bale) of Igboora and is the prescribed authority for the appointment of lesser
chiefs under him. His town falls under Eruwa Local Government, but his
traditional allegiance is to Olubadan. The second defendant belonged to Ajadi
family, The evidence of The 2nd appellant and respondent were brought in by
order of court following the deaths of the original 2nd appellant and
respondent. The appellants were defendants at the trial Court while the
plaintiff was representing the Ojo and Oje families. Due to creation of new
local government the original Ibarapa Local Government has been broken up and
Igboora now falls in Eruwa Local Government. The suit was instituted following
the appointment of 2nd defendant by 1st defendant as Onilado of Igbo Ora.
Plaintiffs case was that the Onilado chieftaincy started or descended from one
Odulana and there has been only six Onilados in the history or Igboora, all descending
from Odulana in the following order:
1. Odulana
2. Akanwo
3. Iyonwu
4. Oje
5. Ojo
6. Ogunrinde.
For the 2nd defendant it was contended that
the Onilado chieftaincy originated from one Durogbade the ancestor of 2nd
defendant and that Ajadi, his father was Onilado before Ojo, that is after Oje,
thus claiming that seven previous Onilados reigned. Thus it was when Ojo, the
fifth Onilado according to the plaintiff, but sixth according to the
defendants, and Ogunrinde (the last Onilado) was appointed, one Olaitan Akande
instituted an action on behalf of himself and Ajadi Family (10 which second
defendant claims ancestry) in 1946 at Ibadan (suit No. 1/1/1946) against
Ogunrinde and Adeoye, the then Baale of Igboora challenging Ogunrinde's
appointment as Onilado. The main plank of Olaitan Akande's claim was that his
own father. Ajadi, was at one time the Onilado. The High Court dismissed the
1946 claim. It must be mentioned that the second defendant belonged to Ajadi
family. The evidence in suit 1/1/1946 (Exhibit A) was to the effect that Ajadi
was never a substantive Onilado but merly acted during minority of the person
entitled. Perhaps he never even died acting in that capacity. On the
entitlement of Ajadi family to Onilado title the plaintiff relied on Exhibit A
as estopped against the defendants and also to establish his claim.
The High Court in this present suit held that
Exhibit A was available as estoppel against second defendant and that no member
of Ajadi family was entitled to the title or Onilado of Igboora. Further the
trial court held that first appellant, as prescribed authority under Chiefs law
was merely to approve appointment of those entitled under customary law to the
minor chiefs under him. Finally it was held that Onilado chieftaincy originated
from Odulana, the ancestor of the plaintiff and not from Durogbade as claimed
by the defendants. Judgment was therefore entered for the plaintiff as claimed.
The defendants appealed to Court of Appeal
which entirely up-held the decision of trial High Court. In arriving at their
decision the Justices held that on the whole the evidence of defendant was in
some respects at variance with their pleadings, that the plaintiff was privy in
blood to first defendant in Exhibit A. that 1st defendant was privy in law to
2nd defendant in Exhibit A, and that 2nd defendant is privy in blood to the
plaintiff in Exhibit A. This Court of Appeal held that on the totality of the
pleadings and evidence before the trial Court including Exhibit A that Court
had come to the right conclusion and therefore dismissed the appeal.
Thus the appeal to this court.
Before this Court, on the grounds of appeal,
the following issues for consideration were raised in the three briefs of
argument as follows:-
1. Appellants:
(a) Whether the judgment in Suit no.1/1/46 -
Exhibit 'A' was available as an estoppel against the 2nd defendant in this case
when the parties in Suit No. 1/1/46 are not the same as the parties in the
present action.
(h) Whether the plaintiff in this case can make
use of the said judgment in Suit No. 1/1/46 as a representative of Oje and Ojo
Families 10 found an estopped against the 2nd defendant in this case when Oje
and Ojo Families were not parties to the action in Suit No. 1/1/46.
(c) Whether any other descendant of Odulana
apart from Oje and Ojo families could still lay claim to Onilado Chieftaincy.
2. In the 2nd appellant's brief only one issue
is formulated as follows:
"Whether or not the parties in Exhibit A
and instant suit are the same having not instituted and defended both suits in
the same right and capacities?"
3. The respondent for his own part, formulated
two Issues, to wit.
I. whether the panics in Exhibit A are the
same as the panics in this suit...
II. whether the holding of the trial Court
referred to by the Count of Appeal that the Onilado chieftaincy was still
restricted to Odulana family was supported by the evidence
Thus, the main issue in contention in this
appeal is the applicability of issue estoppel to this case in view of Exhibit
A. It is indeed surprising that parties in litigation still have doubts as to
when issue estoppel applies. Time and again this Count had occasions to
pronounce on this principle of law and practice. Estoppel is now more than rule
of practice and it can rightly be described as substantive rule of law.
There is estoppel where a party is precluded
from saying a certain statement of fact is untrue whether in reality it is true
or not. Estoppel, in nature, is a conclusion creating a disability whereby a
party is precluded from contending or proving in any legal proceedings that a
fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to
that disability. There are four kinds of estoppel, viz: "Estoppel by
matter of record", "estoppel by deed", "estoppel in
pais" and "promissory estoppel".
Estoppel of record is also
called "estoppel quasi of record" and is commonly called an
"estoppel per rem judicatam" where an issue of fact has been
judicially considered and determined to finality or to the exhaustion of all
judicial remedies. This implies that the fact in issue was judicially
pronounced upon and there was no appeal against that decision, or there was
futile exercise of that right of appeal to finality. The tribunal must have
jurisdiction, concurrent or exclusive, in the matter between the same parties
or their privies on the same facts and subject matter, whether affecting a
certain state of matters as to status of a person or thing. The situation as
far as the facts in issue are concerned is that those facts or issues have
finally been decided and laid to rest between the parties or their privies. It
is a rule to stop vexatious repeated litigation on the same issue between
virtually the same parties and subject-matter. Where the earlier decision is by
a court of record the resulting estoppel is said to be of record; where it is
by any other tribunal it is said to be estoppel quasi record. It does nor
matter whether the earlier decision is by an inferior court of record: the
golden thread always is that that tribunal has jurisdiction and has pronounced
on the facts in issue and it is final whether because of its exclusive
jurisdiction or because there was no appeal against its pronouncement, or where
an appeal was available and utilised. It was futile or failed. (See this Courts
decisions in Balogun v. Adejobi (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 131; Ezeanya v. Okeke
(1995) 4 NWLR (P1. 388) 142; Adedoyo v. Babalola (1995) 7 NWLR (P1. 408) 383:
Faleye Otapo (1995) 3NWLR (Pt.381) 1 among latest expositions of this principle
of estoppel).
The estoppel by deed occurs
where a statement of facts is in a solemn deed made by parties and
authenticated by their seals whereby they cannot be heard to resile from the
facts clearly set out therein. Those facts are clearly binding on the parties
thereto. This is irrelevant to this appeal. It is the estoppel per rem
judicatam (of record) that this appeal relates to.
Where a person by words and or deeds or by
conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of a fact either
with knowledge of its falsehood or with the intention that it should be acted
upon, or has so conducted himself that another would, as a reasonable man in
his full faculties, understand that a certain representation of fact was
intended to be acted upon, and that other person in fact acted upon that
representation whereby his position was thereby altered to his detriment, an
estoppel arises against that person who made the representation and he will not
be allowed to aver that the representation is not what he presented it to be.
I have to dwell at length on this principle of
estoppel to, if possible, allow peace to this Court by litigants who still have
second thoughts on applicability of estoppel.
In this appeal the previous suit in Exhibit A
was between the ancestor in office and blood relation of the first appellant.
Baale Igboora. The issue was the right to the minor chieftaincy of Onilado of
Igboora concerning the descendants of Ajadi family represented here by second
appellant, as opposed to the claim of Odulana descendants represented by
plaintiff. They are all privies in blood and the subject-matter is The same.
The case decided in 1947 in then Supreme Count of Nigeria (which metamorphosed into
present High Court) by Jibowu J (as he then was) and is now Exhibit A has
sealed finally that only descendants of Odulana could be appointed Onilado of
Igboora and that the descendants of Ajadi were not entitled to ascend to that
chieftaincy. This operates as estoppel per rem judicatam against Ajadi family
forever. In my view this suit resulting in this appeal is no more than an
effort to reliligate a matter already decided in Exhibit A in 1947. There must
be an end to litigation.
This matter is therefore decided on this issue
alone. I dismiss this appeal with N10.000.00 costs to respondents.
WALI, J.S.C.: I have been
privileged to read before now, the lead judgment of my learned brother Belgore,
J .S.C and I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion for dismissing
the appeal.
The three issues raised by the appellants deal
with the operation of Judgment in Suit 1/1/1946 now Exhibit A as issue estoppel
and res judicata. The panics in Exhibit A are:
Olaitan Akande
(On behalf of himself and as a representative
of Ajadi family plaintiff And
1. Ogunrinue
2. Adeoye (Ibale of Igboora) defendants
In that case, Jibowu J (as he then was)
reviewed the evidence before him and made the following findings:-
"With regard to Ayesewon, it appears to
me that the evidence for the defence is to be accepted that he was only an
acting Onilado in the absence of Iyowun and that he had to yield place to
Iyowun on his return from Iseyin as the plaintiff knows nothing about his
connection with Efunlodi, wire of Iyowun.
The office of Bale is the highest title in
Igboora, and the title of Olukown comes next. Both the 2nd defendant and
Ogundele, the Olukotun never held any minor titles before they were appointed
to their high offices. These, the plaintiff had to admit, his suggestion that
only a man who had received a minor title could be made the Onilado is untrue.
I do not believe the plaintiff, in view or the
evidence of the defendants which I accept, that he performed the funeral
Obsequies of the last Onilado.
I am satisfied that the 1st defendant and
Emmanuel Oguntoyinbo know their family history better than the 2nd defendant
and that Ogundele, the Olukotun, who knew the various Onilados from Akanwo
personally, is a witness of truth. I accept his evidence that Oduntan was not a
brother of Iyowun; that Odubiyi was Odutan's father and that he was never an
Onilado; that Oje was son of Akanwo and not of Iyowun."
As can be gathered from the pleadings and the
evidence adduced in this case the main issue is whether Ajadi family was one of
traditionally recognised families entitled to vie for Onilado chieftaincy in
Igboora. The 2nd defendant who was from Ajadi Family was appointed by the 1st
defendant to the minor chieftaincy of Onilado in his capacity as the prescribed
authority. This led the present plaintiffs to institute the present action
claiming that Ajadi family is not one of the recognised ruling families
entitled to vie for the Onilado chieftaincy.
At the conclusion of the case, Ademakinwa J
reviewed the evidence presented by all sides to the litigation and found that:-
"The issue, which the plaintiff in the
present case alleged was decided in the previous case is whether Ajadi, the
ancestor of both Olaitan Akande (the Plaintiff in that case) and the 2nd
defendant in the present case, was ever installed as a substantive Onilade or
that he merely acted in that capacity.
There is no doubt in my mind after carefully
reading Exhibit "A" that this issue was thoroughly canvassed by the
parties to the suit No. 1/1/46 and that the Court made a solemn finding on the
issue."
"The record is conclusive as to the
capacity in which a plaintiff sued. (See: Henderson v Henderson (1844) 6 Q.B.
288 at page 298). In Exhibit "A" Olaitan Akande was shown to have
instituted the action on behalf of himself and as a representative of the Ajadi
family. It could also be gathered from Exhibit "A" and oral testimony
or the plaintiff's witnesses that Ogunrinde (the 1st defendant in the previous
case) was sued as a representative of the Ojo/Oje families who claimed to be
exclusively entitled to present candidates for Onilado chieftaincy; while the
2nd defendant (Adeoye) was sued as the Baale of Igboora. It is therefore not
correct to say that any of the defendants in the previous case, was sued in his
personal capacity as was the case in the Shitla-Bey's case. It is settled law
that the judgment in a representative action is binding on all the members of
the class represented as they are deemed to be present by representation."
"There is also evidence in the present
case that the plainliff is basing his claim to Onilado chieftaincy on the fact
of his being a descendant or Ojo while the 2nd defendant has based his own
claim on the fact of his being a descendant of Ajadi who, according to the 2nd defendant
was at one time a substantive Onilado of Igboora and not an acting Onilado as
alleged by the plaintiff. The claim of Olaitan Akande, the plaintiff in the
former action depended on whether Ajadi was a substantive or acting Onilado.
The Court in that case as shown in Exhibit "A" has found that Ajadi
was a substantive or acting Onilado. The Court in that case as shown in Exhibit
"A" has found that Ajadi was really an acting Onilado and accordingly
from the evidence adduced that the 2nd defendant in the present case is a
privy-in-blood to Olaitan Akande, the plaintiff in the previous action, In the
circumstances the 2nd defendant is estopped from relitigating the issue as to
whether his ancestor Ajadi was an acting Onilado or not, This issue had been resolved
against him as a privy of Olaitan Akande and it is no longer open to him to
reopen the Issue.
The learned trial Judge then concluded on this
issue as follows:-
The sum total of all these is that the 2nd
defendant in the present case as a privy-in blood of Olaitan Akande is estopped
from relitigating the issue as to whether or not Ajadi was an acting Onilado of
Igboora - an issue which had previously been decided against him as shown in
Exhibit "A", That being the case the 2nd defendant or any other
person routing his claim through Ajadi is not entitled, in my view, to be
appointed as Onilado of Igboora."
Aggrieved by the decision or the trial court,
the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal. In a unanimous judgment of that
court Ogundare JCA (as he then was) affirmed the issue of res judicata against
the defendants, particularly the 2nd defendant. The learned trial Justice said
in his lead Judgment that-
"Exhibit A, that is the Judgment in suit
1/1/1946 was relied on by the plaintiff. The learned trial judge held that the
2nd defendant was estopped by Exhibit A from relitigating the entitlement of
his family, the Ajadi family to the Onilado chieftaincy that issue having been
decided against his family in that suit, this finding has come under attack in
this ground. The gravamen of the appellants complaint is that parties are not
the same in suit 1/1/1946 and the present action in that while Ogunrinde was sued
in his personal capacity in Exhibit A. the plaintiff in the present action sued
in representative capacity. I regret I cannot accept Mr. Arasi's submissions
both in his brief and in his oral argument before us, In suit 1/1/1946, Olaitan
Akande sued on behalf of the AJADI FAMILY and the main claim in that case as
also in the present appeal, was the entitlement of the AJADI FAMILY to the
Onilado chieftaincy. Akande lost. The defendants in that case were (a)
Ogunrinde the then Onilado and a member of the OJE section of the ODULANA
FAMILY, the family the trial judge found to he the only family entitled to the
Onilado chieftaincy and (b) Adeoye, the Bale of Igboora and The
predecessor-in-Office of the 1st defendant in the present appeal. The second
defendant in the present suit was a member of the Ajadi Family that look the
earlier action, It is a misconception of the law to say that the 1st and 2nd
defendants were not privies to the 2nd defendant and plaintiff respectively in
suit 1/1/1946.
I hold that the plaintiff in this case was a
privy in blood of the 2nd defendant, Ogunrinde in the earlier suit and that
this 1st defendant is a privy in law of the 1st defendant in the earlier suit.
The 2nd defendant in this appeal is a privy in blood of the plaintiff to the
earlier suit.
I am satisfied from all I have said above that
the learned trial Judge properly applied the doctrine of issue estoppel in this
case and rightly found that the appellants were estopped from relitigating the
issue of the entitlement of the AJADI family to the Onilado chieftaincy it
having been held in exhibit A that Ajadi was never an Onilado.
I cannot agree more with these findings by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeal on the question of issue estoppel
operating as rem judicata against the 2nd defendant.
He is undoubtedly a privy in blood of the
plaintiff in suit No. 1/1/1946.The finding of the trial court in Exhibit A. is
binding not only on the 2nd defendant in that case who was sued in his official
capacity but also on the 1st defendant in the present case as the
successor-in-office of the 2nd defendant in the said earlier case. See Reichal
v. Magrath (1889) 14ac 665: Fadiora & Anor v. Gbadebo & Anor. (1978) 3
SC 219; Coker & Anor v. Sanraolu (1976) 9 & 10 SC 2203 and Iyaji v. Erigebe
(1987)3 NWLR (pt 61)523,
The defendants in Exhibit A are from Onilado
family from which the two sub-families of Oje and Ojo descended. Exhibit A was
fought on that basis. Reading Exhibit A as a whole one cannot escape the
conclusion that the defendants defended the case in are presentative capacity
for Onilado Family. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs/appellant contention that
Ajadi Family sued Ogunrinde in suit No.1/1/1946 in the latters personal
capacity, he fought and defended the case in a representative capacity for his
family. See Ojo v. Abadie (1955) 15 WACA 54.
It is for these and the more elaborate reasons
contained in the lead Judgment of my learned brother Belgore, J.S.C that I also
here by dismiss the appeal with N10,000.00 costs to the respondents.
OGWUEGBU, J.S.C: I have had
the preview, in draft, of the judgment just read by my learned brother,
Belgore, J.S.C., and I am in complete agreement with him that this appeal
should be dismissed.
The main issue canvassed by the appellants was
whether the judgment in suit No. 1/1/46 Exhibit "A" was available as
an estoppel against the 2nd defendant/appellant in this case when the parties
in suit No. 1/1/46 are not the same as the panics in the present action.
The facts of the case briefly stated are that
only two families are entitled under native law and custom of Igboora to
provide candidates for the stool of Onilado of Igboora - a minor chieftaincy
under the chiefs law of Oyo State and that the Baale of Igboora is the
prescribed authority and he approves appointment to the said chieftaincy. The
chieftaincy is restricted to the Oje and Ojo branches of Odulana family.
Odulana was the first Onilado of 19boora. Ogunrinde, the last Onilado who died
in 1977 came from Oje branch and it was then the turn of Ojo branch to present
the next Onilado. The plaintiff who belonged to the Ojo branch was in December.
1977 appointed by his branch to succeed Ogunrinde and his name was forwarded to
the 1st defendant/appellant for approval. He refused to approve the plaintiffs
appointment but rather approved that of the 2nd defendant/appellant - Macaulay
Olaoye who hailed from the Ajadi family. Macaulay Olaoye was installed by the
1st defendant.
In 1946 one Olaitan Akande of the Ajadi family
acting on behalf of Ajadi family sued Ogunrinde, the then Onilado and one
Adeoye, the then Baale of 19boora claiming the right of Ajadi family to the
Onilado chieflaincy (suit No. 1/1/46). The suit was dismissed. See Exhibit 'A'.
The plaintiff/respondent denied that he was related to the 2nd defendant, the
case of the 1st and 2nd defendants was to the effect that the Onilado
chieftaincy belonged to all the descendants of Durogbade, the common ancestor
of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant and that the only family entitled to the
chieftaincy was Durogbade family.
From the pleadings and the evidence the main
issue arising in the case was whether the Ajadi family was entitled to the
Onilado chieftaincy. The learned trial Judge accepted plaintiffs evidence as to
the origin of Onilado chieftaincy and the number and identities of the previous
Onilado of Igboora. He rejected the evidence fohedefence on those points. He
further held that the 2nd defendant was estopped from relitigating the issue as
to whether or not Ajadi was an acting Onilado of Igboora which issue had been
decided against Glaitan Akande in suit No, 1/1/46 (Exhibit 'A'). The learned
trial Judge held as follows.
There is also evidence in the present case
that the plaintiff is basing his claim to Onilado chieftaincy on the fact of
his being a descendant of Ojo while the 2nd defendant has based his own claim
on the fact of his being a descendant of Ajadi who, according to the 2nd
defendant was alone time a substantive Onilado of Igboora and not an acting
Onilado as alleged by the plaintiff. The claim of Olaitan Akande, the plaintiff
in the former action depended on whether Ajadi was a substantive or a Cling
Onilado. The court in that case as shown in Exhibit "A" has found
that Ajadi was really an acting Onilado and accordingly dismissed Olaitan
Akande's claim. I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that the 2nd defendant
in the present case is a privy-in-blood to Olaitan Akande, the plaintiff in the
previous action. In the circumstance the 2nd defendant is eslopped from relitigating
the issue as to whether his ancestor Ajadi was in acting Onilado or not. This
issue has been resolved against him as a privy of Olaitan Akande and it is no
longer open to him to reopen the issue.
The court below in affirming the above
conclusion of the learned trial Judge said:
I regret I cannot accept Mr. Arasi's
submissions both in his brief and in his oral argument before us. In suit
1/1/46, Olaitan Akande sued on behalf of the AJADI FAMILY and the main claim in
that case as also in the present appeal, was the entitlement or the AJADI
FAMILY to the Onilado chieftaincy. Akande lost. The defendants in that case
were (a) Ogunrinde the then Onilado and a member of OJE section of the ODULANA
FAMILY, the family the trial judge found to be the only family entitled to the
Onilado chieftaincy and (b) Adeoye, the Baale of Igboora and the
predecessor-in-office of the 1st defendant in the present appeal. The second
defendant in the present suit was a member of the Ajadi family that took the
earlier action. It is a misconception of the law to say that the 1st and 2nd
defendants were not privies to the 2nd defendants and plaintiff respectively in
suit 1/1/46. Ogunrinde who was then Onilado, was a descendant of ODULANA, the
first Onilado. The plaintiff in the present action was also a member of the
ODULANA family being also a descendant of Odulana."
Learned counsel for the 1stand 2nd
defendants/appellants submitted in their respective briefs and in oral
arguments that the position taken by the count below was erroneous in that it
failed to consider the effect, if any, the different capacities in which the
actions were instituted and defended had on the plea of estoppel. It was
submitted that actions fought or defended in different rights and capacities
cannot be used to estop any of the parties or their privies because the parties
in such circumstances are regarded as different. We were referred to the cases
of Re Deeley's Patents (1895) I Ch.687, Fadiora v Gbadebo (1978)3S.C.2 19.
Ezeanya v. Okeke (1995) 4 NWLR (PU88) 142 and Shitta Bey & Ors. v. The
chairman, L.E.D.B. & ORS (1966)2 N.S.C.C 252.
I have carefully studied Exhibit "A"
and the Judgment of the count below giving rise to this appeal and I have no
doubt in my mind that the court below correctly applied the doctrine of issue
estoppel to this case. Issue estoppel arises where an issue had earlier on been
adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes
incidentally in question in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties
or their privies. The conditions for the application for the doctrine are that:
(i) The same question was decided in both
proceedings:
(ii) The judicial decision said to create the
estoppel was final: and
(iii) The parties to the judicial decision or
their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which
the estoppel is raised on their privies.
See: Fadiora & or v. Gbadebo & or
(supra).
In Exhibit "A", Olaitan Akande as
plaintiff sued Ogunrinde and Adeoye (Baale of Igboora). He sued "on behalf
of himself and as a representative of the Ajadi Family." The learned trial
judge found as follows:
"In Exhibit "A" Olaitan Akande
was shown to have instituled the action on behalf of himself and as a
representative of the Ajadi family. It could also be gathered from Exhibit
"A" and oral testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses that Ogunrinde
(the 1st defendant in the previous case) was sued as a representative of tile
Ojo/Oje families who claimed to be exclusively entitled to present candidates
for Ondado Chieftaincy; while the 2nd defendant (Adeoye) was sued as the Baale
of Igboora. It is therefore not correct to say that any of the defendants in
the previous case, was sued in his personal capacity as was the case in
Shitta-Bey's case. It is settled law that the judgment in a representative
action is binding on all members of he class represented as they are deemed to
be present by representation. (See Opebiyi v. Oshoboja (1976) 9 & 10S.C.195
at p.200: Pabiekun & Ors. V. Ajayi (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 197 at 198."
In the present proceedings, the plaintiff is
basing his claim to Onilado chieftaincy on the fact of his being a descendant
of Ojo while the 2nd defendant based his claim on the fact of his being a
descendant of Ajadi, who according to him (2nd defendant) was at one time a
substantive Onilado Igboora and not an acting onilado as alleged by the
plaintiff. The claim of the plaintiff (alai tan Akande) in Exhibit
"A" depended on whether Ajadi was a substantive or acting Onilado.
The court in that case found that Ajadi was in fact an acting Onilado and
accordingly dismissed Olaitan Akande's claim.
Having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the parties in the earlier suit and the present is as to the
entitlement of members of Ajadi family to Onilado chieftaincy. I am satisfied
that the 2nd defendant/appellant herein is a privy of Olaitan Akande. He is
accordingly estopped from relitigating the issue as to whether his ancestor
Ajadi was an acting Onilado or not. See Ijaji v. Eyigebe (1987)3 NWLR (Pt. 61)
532 at 534.
In Coker & Or. v.
Sanyaolu (1976) 9-10 S.C. 20:1, this court considered the terminology
"Privies" in relation to the doctrine of res judicata and classified
them into three namely:
(1) Privies in blood (as ancestor and heir);
(2) Privies in law (as testator and executor;
intestate and administrator) and
(3) Privies inestate (as vendor and purchaser,
lessor and lessee).
It is the first class that is applicable to
the case in hand.
Similarly, the plaintiff in the earlier action
claimed entitlement to Onilado of Igboora chieftaincy which was at that time
occupied by Ogunrinde of Oje branch of Odulana family. The said chieftaincy was
restricted to Ojo and Oje branches of Odunlana family. He was equally a
privy-in-blood of Ogunrinde (the first defendant in Exhibit "A").
Any person tracing his ancestry to Odunlana in
respect of Onilado chieftaincy will be bound by the judgment in Exhibit
"A" because he is privy-in-blood in respect of Onilado chieftaincy.
Adeoye the second defendant in the earlier suit was sued as Baale of Igboora
just as Jacob Oyerogba the first defendant in the present action was sued as
Baale of Igboora. He is privy -in -law to Adeoye. The judgment in Exhibit,
"A" is conclusive for or against the parties in the present suit. See
16 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition P. 1041 Article 1543.
A plea of estoppel is not
sustainable only where the heading of the later action strictly reflected the
same capacity as in the earlier one, Strict emphasis on the heading of the
action to show capacity is misleading. Once it is made clear that the self-same
question is substantially in issue in two suits the precise form in which
either suit is brought or the fact that the plaimiff in the one case was the
defendant in the other is immaterial. The estoppel subsists between the panics.
See Ojo v. Abadie 15 W.A.C.A 54 at 55. The issue in this case had been decided
in the earlier action and the appellants cannot now impeach that judgment and
the doctrine of issue estoppel applied. Once it is shown that the panics in the
earlier and the Inter proceedings are the same or their privies as was shown in
the present case, the court is left to find out whether the other two
conditions are satisfied. The other two conditions are not part of the
defendants' complaints in this appeal.
I must at this stage say that the facts of the
case of Shitta-Bey & Ors V. L.E.D.B. & Ors. (supra) cited by the
learned appellants are not the same as the facts of the present case. In that
case, the 2nd respondent had sued in a personal capacity in the earlier case
and not in a representative capacity and the later suit did not involve his
personal rights. The earlier case could not therefore constitute res judicaram
and the parties could not be the same.
For the reasons I have given above and for the
fuller reasons in the judgment of my learned brother Belgore, J.S.C. I will
dismiss the appeal on issue estoppel alone with N10,000.00 costs to the
plaintiff/respondent.
MOHAMMED, J.S.C.: I entirely
agree with the opinion of my learned brother, Belgore, J.S.C, In the judgment
just read. I have had the privilege to read the judgment in draft before now.
It is crystal clear that the appellants are descendants of Ajadi who was held
in Exhibit 'A' to have only acted as an Onilado during the minority of the
person entitled. Exhibit "A" was Suit No. 1/1/1946. J agree that the
judgment Exhibit A, operates as an estoppel per rem judicaram against the Ajadi
family. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the court of
Appeal affirming the decision of the trial High Court is hereby affirmed. I
also award N10,000.00 costs to the plaintiff/respondent.
IGUH, J.S.C.: I have had the
privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment just delivered by my learned
brother, Belgore. J.S.C. and J agree entirely that there is no merit in [his
appeal.
The appeal is in respect of the Onilado
chieftaincy in the Ibarapa Local Government Area of Oyo State, From the grounds
of appeal filed, it is apparent that the main issue that arises for
determination in this appeal is whether the judgment in the Ibadan Supreme
court Suit No. 1/1/1946. Exhibit A, operates as issue estoppel against the 2nd
appellant precluding him from relitigating the entitlement of his family the
Ajadi family, to the Onilado chieftaincy. The gravamen of the appellants'
complaint is that the parties in the present suit are not the same as those in
the previous suit. It is their contention that the defendants in Exhibit A
defended the suit personally and not in a representative capacity.
The issue which the respondents maintain was
decided in Exhibit A is that Ajadi, the ancestor of both Olaitan Akande (the
plaintiff in that case) and the 2nd defendant/appellant in the present case,
was never installed as a substantive Onilado but merely acted in that capacity.
In this regard, the trial court stated thus:
There is no doubt in my mind after carefully
reading Exhibit "A" that this issue was thoroughly canvassed by the
parties to the Suit No. 1/1/46 and that the court made a solemn finding on the
issue. At page 3 of the said Exh "A" the following passages occurs:
.... There can be no doubt that at one time in
their history the father of the plaintiff Ajadi, was known as the Onilado, but
the evidence is that he was never formally installed as he was made to act
during the minority of Ojo on the death of his friend and relation-in-law Oje.
Evidently the younger men who knew him to have been called the Onilado were not
aware that he was only an acting man, but the older men, like the Olukotun,
knew well this fact"
The above finding is clear and lucid. It was
also affirmed by the court below. The real question is whether the parties in
Exhibit A and the present suit are the same or not.
It has long been settled that an issue
estoppel arises where an issue has been adjudicated upon in an earlier suit by
a court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue comes incidentally in
question in any subsequent proceedings between the same parties or their
privies. See Fadiora and Another v. Gbadebo and another (1987) 3 S.C. 219. This
is based on the legal principle that a party is precluded from contending the
contrary or opposite of any specific point which having once been distinctly
put in issue, has solemnly and with certainty been determined against him.
Issue estoppel applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision is
one of fact or law or one of mixed fact and law.
Three elements must however be established for
a plea of issue estoppel to apply. These are:-
(1) The same question must have been decided
in both suits
(2) The judicial decision relied upon to
create the estoppel must he final.
(3) The parties to the judicial decision or
their privies must be the same in both proceedings.
See too Fadiora and Another v. Gbadebo and
Another (supra).
It is only with the third element that this
appeal is concerned.
In this regard, the learned trial judge stated
as follows:-
I do not think the principle in Shina-bey's
case is applicable here. The record is conclusive as to the capacity in which a
plaintiff sued. (See: Henderson v. Henderson (1844) 6 Q.B. 288 at page 298). In
Exhibit "A" Olaitan Akande was shown to have instituted the action on
behalf of himself and as a representative of the Ajadi family. It could also be
gathered from Exhibit 'A' and the oral testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses
that Ogunrinde (the 1st defendant in the previous case) was sued as a
representative of the Ojo/Oje families who claimed to be exclusively entitled
to present candidates for Onilado chieftaincy: while the 2nd defendant (Adeoye)
was sued as the Bale of Igboora. It is therefore not correct to say that any of
the defendants in the previous case, was sued in his personal capacity as was
the case in the Shina-Bey's case. It is settled law that the judgment in a
representative action is binding on all the members of the class represented as
they are deemed to be representation. (See: Opebi) v. Oshoboja (1976) 9 &
10 S.C. 195 at p.200: Pabiekun & Ors. V. Ajayi (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 197
p.198). On this principle, both the members of Ajadi family (including the 2nd
defendant in the present case) and the members of the Oje and Ojo families
(including the plaintiff in the present case) are bound by the decision in Suit
No. 1/1/46 as shown in Exhibit 'A'.
He continued:-
"I am satisfied from the evidence adduced
that the 2nd defendant in the present case is a privy-in -blood to Olaitan
Akande, the plaintiff in the previous action. In the circumstances the 2nd
defendant is estopped from relitigating the issue as to whether his ancestor
Ajadi was an acting Onilado or not. This issue had been resolved against him as
a privy of Olaitan Akande and it is no longer open to him to reopen the
issue."
He then concluded:-
"The sum total of all these is that the
2nd defendant in the present case, as a privy -in-blood of Olaitan Akande, is
estoppled from relitigating the issue as to whether or not Ajadi was an acting
Onilado of Igboora - an issue which had previously been decided against him as
shown in Exhibit "A". That being the case, the 2nd defendant or any
other person routing his claim through Ajadi is not entitled, in my view, to be
appointed as Onilado of Igboora."
The Court of Appeal, for its own part, dealing
with the same issue, per the leading judgment of Ogundare, J.C.A., as he then
was, with which, Omo and Onu, JJ.C.A., as they then were agreed, resolved the
issue as follows:-
"I regret I cannot accept Mr. Arasi's
submissions both in his brief and in his oral argument before us. In suit
1/1/946, Olaitan Akande sued on behalf of the Ajadi family and the main claim
in that case as also in the present appeal, was the entitlement of the Ajadi
family to the Onilado chieftaincy. Akande lost. The defendants in that case
were (a) Ogunrinde the then Onilado and a member of the Oje section of the
Odunlana family, the family the trial judge found to be the only family
entitled to the Onilado chieftaincy and (b) Adeoye, the Bale of Igboora and the
predecessor -in-office of the 1st defendant in the present appeal. The second
defendant in the present suit was a member of the Ajadi Family that took the
earlier action. It is a misconception of the law to say that the 1st and 2nd
defendants were not privies to the 2nd defendant and plaintiff respectively in
suit 1/1/1946. Ogunrinde who was then Onilado was a descendant of Odunlana, the
first Onilado. The plaintiff in the present action was also a member of the
Odunlana family being also a descendant of Odunlana.
The term "Privies was considered by the
Supreme Court in Coker & Anor V. Sanyaolu (1976) 9 & 10 S.C. 203, 223
wherein Idigbe J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the court said:
"Privies are of three classes and they
are (1) Privies in blood (as ancestor and heir); (2) Privies in law (as
testator and executor; intestate and administrator) (3) Privies in Estate
(which we think is germane to the case in hand) as Vendor and purchaser, lessor
and lessee (see also 15 Halsbury Laws of England 3rd Edition P.196 Article
372)."
I hold that the plaintiff in this case was a
privy in blood of the 2nd defendant, Ogunrinde in the earlier suit and that
this 1st defendant is a privy in law of the 1st defendant in the earlier suit.
The 2nd defendant in this appeal is a privy in blood of the plaintiff to the
earlier suit.
I am satisfied from all I have said above that
the learned trial judge properly applied the doctrine of issue estoppel in this
case and rightly found that the appellants were estopped from relitigating the
issue of the entitlement of the Ajadi family to the Onilado chieftaincy, it
having been held in Exhibit A that Ajadi was never an Onilado" I have
carefully examined the issue under consideration and must state that I agree
entirely with both court below that Exhibit A constitutes issue estoppel
against The 2nd appellant and other members of the Ajadi family. This is
because the 1st defendant in Exhibit A is a privy in blood to the plaintiff herein
while the 2nd respondent herein is also a privy in blood of the plaintiff in
Exhibit A. The dispute between the parties in the two cases relates to whether
members of Ajadi family are entitled to become Onilado. This issue was resolved
against the 2nd appellant and members of the Ajadi family and cannot now be
relitigated.
It is for the above and the more detailed
reasons contained in the leading judgment that I, too, dismiss this appeal as
unmeritorious. I abide by the order for costs therein made.
Appeal dismissed
Appearances
Mr. J.O. Onibanjo
For Appellant
AND
Mr. Kola Awodein
For Respondent
E Share
: RATIO
DECIDENDI
1. EVIDENCE - "Privies": Classification of
"Privies" in relation to the doctrine of res judicata (...read in
context)
2. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL: The Nature of Estoppel (...read in
context)
3. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL BY DEED: When is Estoppel by deed
said to occur (...read in context)
4. EVIDENCE - ISSUE ESTOPPEL: When is issue estoppel said
to arise (...read in context)
5. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL: Types of Estoppel (...read in
context)
6. EVIDENCE - PLEA OF ESTOPPEL: When is a plea of estoppel
said to be unsuitable (...read in context)
7. EVIDENCE - ESTOPPEL OF RECORD: Nature of Estoppel of
Record (...read in context)
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